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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND HAROLD SHEPHERD
ALIBI
State v. Wagner, Iowa, (1928) 222 N. V. 407. Burden of proof.
Defendant was prosecuted for stealing chickens. He offered evidence to the
effect that on the night in question he was riding in his automobile some distance
away but that he did not go to the prosecuting witness' ranch and did not steal
the chickens. The trial court instructed the jury on the law of alibi. Defendant
was convicted and appeals on the ground that the defense of alibi was not
involved. Held, the defense of alibi was not involved since "it might be found
that he (defendant) could have readily been at the Day's ranch," whereas an
alibi contemplates that by reason of extraneous facts it was impossible that
defendant could have been present. The giving of the instructions constituted
prejudicial error. Case reversed. The Iowa cases have made a distinction
between a defense which "controverts the state's evidence," incidentally showing
that defendant was not present at the time and place charged and a defense
which goes farther and attempts to prove affirmatively "not merely that he was
not present but by reason of extraneous facts it was impossible that he could
have been present." In the first case the burden of proof is on the state beyond
a reasonable doubt; in the second, the defendant has the burden of proof and
must sustain it by a preponderance of the evidence. Such a distinction seems
unsound on principle and arises perhaps from a failure to see that alibi is not an
affirmative defense at all. Defendant's presence and participation in the crime
are essential elements of the state's case and any defense of being in a different
place inconsistent with participation in the crime is in direct denial. Nor does it
cease to be in denial because the defendant was one mile away from the scene of
the crime instead of 1,000 miles. The case is noted in 27 Mich. Law Rev. 702.
ALIENS
United States . Kellogg, Secretary of State, Ct. of App., D. C., (1929) 30
Fed. (2nd) 984. Immigration Act of 1917 and 1924 not unconstitutional as
denial of due process or as infliction of crnel and nnusual punishment.
After deciding that a citizen of Germany remained an alien notwithstanding
her subsequent marriage to a native born American citizen (Cable Act, 2, 8 U. S.
C. A. 368) and that "theft" involves "moral turpitude" within meaning of Immi-
gration Act of 1917 providing for exclusion of persons who have been convicted
of, or admit having committed a felony or other crime involving moral turpi-
tude, held, that these provisions of the Immigration Act are not unconstitutional
as depriving parties of liberty without due process of law or inflicting cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.
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BURGLARY
State v. Bull, Idaho, 276 Pac. 528. Meaning of cntry.
Entry into pool room open to public during business hours and through
front door, which general public was invited to use, constituted "burglary,"
under Crim. Sts., sec. 8400, if defendant or his accomplice made entrance for
purpose of committing larceny therein, under Crim. Sts., secs. 8093, 8845; invita-
tion to enter for lawful purpose not extending to persons entering for unlawful
purposes.
COERCION
Stadia v. State, Ind., 166 N. E. 25. Presumption of coercion: husband and
wife.
Common-law rule that married woman who committed a crime in presence
of her husband, except treason or murder, was presumed to have acted under his
direction, compulsion, and coercion, has not been changed by statute in Indiana,
but such presumption is rebuttable and only prima facie.
CONCEALED WEAPONS
Pierce v. State, Okla., 275 Pac. 393. Carrying concealed weapon on one's
own; premises.
Under sec. 1992, Comp. Okla. Sts. (1921), providing, "It shall be unlawful
for any person in the State of Oklahoma to carry upon or about his person any
pistol, revolver, bowie-knife, dirk-knife, loaded cane, billy, metal knuckles, or any
other offensive or defensive weapon, except as in this article provided," held,
that a defendant may be properly convicted of carrying on or about his person a
revolver, and that the fact that the revolver is carried upon his person within the
curtilage of his own premises is immaterial.
Davenport, J., dissenting, said: "This seems to be the first time in the his-
tory of the criminal courts that any one has ever been arrested for carrying a
weapon in his own home or within his yard, the curtilage of his home under a
statute regulating the wearing or carrying of a 15istol. 'Many cases are found
where the defendant has been arrested for carrying weapons in violation of the
statutes of his state, yet I fail to find any where a man has been arrested and
convicted for carrying a weapon that he had a right to own and possess in his
house or in his yard, the curtilage of his home, nor does the majority opinion
cite any case from any court in this or any other state where the defendant has
ever been convicted for carrying a pistol in his home or his yard."
CONFESSIONS
Rex v. Booher, Alberta, Can., (1928) 50 Can. Cr. Cas. 271. Confession
which may have been, and which the Crown cannot show zc's not, induced by
mental suggestion exercised on accused, not admissible.
Defendant was accused of murder. Dr. Langsner who claimed to be able to
exercise hypnotic effects upon a subject by feeling his thoughts, visited the
defendant in the guard room. His declared purpose was to get evidence of the
location of the rifle with which the killing was done. The next day Dr. Langs-
ner was able to locate the rifle easily although others had searched in vain. Dr.
Langsner made subsequent visits to the defendant for the admitted purpose of
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getting a confession. Dr. Langsner testified, however, that on these visits there
were no conversations with defendant. After one of them, Dr. Langsner told
the guards they might expect a confession in a few minutes, and shortly there-
after defendant called a guard and made the confession, the admissibility of
which is now in question. Held, the evidence raised a doubt as to the methods
used by Dr. Langsner and that the Crown having failed to discharge the burden
of establishing that defendant was not under the influence of mental suggestion,
the confession would not be admitted.
CONTEMPT
United States v. Karns, Dist. Ct., N. Dist., Okla., (1928) 27 Fed. (2nd) 453.
Offering false and fraudulent instrunent in evidence and testifying falsely con-
stitutes contempt. Fact that perjury is also substantive crime does not bar pun-
ishment for contempt.
Defendant was charged with violation of an injunction order prohibiting
the maintenance of a public nuisance. She interposed the defense that the
premises in question had been leased by her to one Rush and offered in evidence
what purported to be a lease of the premises to him. There was no such person
as Rush, the lease was false and fraudulent, and defendant not only herself gave
perjured testimony in connection with the alleged transaction but also got others
to do so. Held, such conduct was punishable as a contempt. "Perjury, vhile it
may not of itself be punishable as a contempt apart from its obstructive ten-
dency, yet where it is attended with other circumstances of an obstructive ten-
dency inherently affecting and impeding the administration of justice, such is
punishable as a contempt." The principal case is noted in 38 Yale Law Jour. 543.
ENTRAPMENT
Jones v. Dental Commission of Connecticut, Conn., 145 Atd. 570.
Private detective's conduct in going to dentist's office, with knowledge that
unlicensed assistant was alone therein, to get him to do work on her teeth, with
view to affording means for proceedings to cancel his registration, under Gen.
Sts. (1918), sec. 2901, for practicing dentistry without license, in violation of
sec. 2899, without presence and supervision of licensed dentist, as required by
sec. 2906, held not so repugnant to good morals and sound policy as to require
dismissal of proceedings on ground of entrapment.
INDIcTMENT
People v. Balalas, Ill., 166 N. E. 47. Knowledge of insufficient funds:
intent to defraud.
Indictment under Crim. Code, par. 164 (Cahill, "Revised Statutes" [1921],
ch. 38), for obtaining waiver of lien by means of check which defendant did not
have sufficient funds to meet was insufficient, where it did not allege defendant's
knowledge that he had insufficient funds, as such knowledge could not be
inferred from averment that act was committed with intent to defraud.
Farmer, J., dissenting.
People v. Hirschler, Calif. D. C. A., 277 Pac. 170. Simplified short formn of
indictment.
Under Penal Code, sec. 951, as amended by Sts. (1927), p. 1043, prescribing
form of pleading in criminal cases, information charging that defendants robbed
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certain person held not objectionable because omitting elements of force and
fear and use of dangerous and deadly weapon nor for uncertainty in not alleg-
ing that taking was from the possession or immediate presence of victims.
People v. Wickersham, Calif. D. C. A., 277 Pac. 121. Sufliciency of indict-
ment under statute combining the crimes of larceny, embezzlement and false
pretenses.
Where indictment charging that defendant did "take, steal, and carry away"
certain property was sufficient, defendant had all information contemplated by
law as to nature of charge, under Penal Code, sec. 484, as amended by Sts.
(1927), p. 1046, and could not object to proof of any species of theft named in
sec. 484 as insufficient to sustain charge, on ground that indictment did not advise
him whether he was accused of stealing, embezzling, or obtaining by false pre-
tenses property of another.
JURISDICTION
Tillitson v. Milinore, Dist. Ct., Dist. of Mass., (1929) 30 Fed. (2nd) 559.
Federal District Court has no jurisdiction over criminal proceeding under state
law.
Plaintiff, a citizen of Illinois, brought a bill in equity to enjoin the chief of
police of Watertown, Mass., from taking proceedings to confiscate the plaintiff's
coin-controlled vending apparatus as a gambling device. Notwithstanding the
suit involved the jurisdictional amount of the Federal Courts and that there was
diversity of citizenship, held that the action was in essence a proceeding under
the criminal laws of the state of Massachusetts to test the question whether
plaintiff's apparatus is a gambling device and over such cases the Federal Court
has no jurisdiction.
JURY
People v. Barrett, Calif., 276 Pac. 1003. Collective e.ramination of jut..
Judge's action of collectively examining entire jury panel before drawing
names and then restricting counsel's examination to matters not covered by him
held sufficient to warrant reversal of conviction and order denying new trial
under Const., art. 6, sec. 4Y, and as denying right secured to defendant by Penal
Code, sec. 1078, as amended by Sts. (1927), p. 1039, requiring trial when facts
are denied, and reasonable examination of jurors, where defendant's denial of
guilt and statements of wife as state's witness raised conflict.
KiDNAPPING
State v. Miller, Mo., (1929 14 S. W. (2nd) 621. Forcible taking of child
under age of 12 for short period, during which indecent liberties are taken Tvith
the person constitute offense.
The evidence showed that defendant forcibly took a little girl in an automo-
bile to an abandoned spot and took indecent liberties with her person but short of
the crime of rape. He then abandoned her. Held, conviction under Rev. Sts.
(1919), 3270, for forcibly taking and carrying away child under the age of
twelve, with intent to detain and conceal the child from its parents, sustained.
Blair, P. J., dissented: "Of course there was temporary detention and conceal-
ment such as would be necessary before appellant could accomplish his lascivious
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purpose; but such detention-was purely incidental and did not characterize the
intention with which appellant took the child. Such detention -and concealment
were directed against all the world and not particularly against the custody of
the parent. Sec. 3270 denounces an offense against the custody of the parent or
guardian and not an offense against the person of the child."
LARCENY
People v. Canadian Fur Trappers' Corporation, N. Y., (1928) 161 N. E. 455.
Liability of Corporation for larceny.
The defendant corporation was found guilty of larceny and fined $5,OCO, and
appeals. Defendant was engaged in the business of selling fur coats and the evi-
dence showed that it had sold one to the complaining witness who made a cash
deposit. The coat was to be stored for her and delivered when she called.
When she returned for it her coat was gone and the salesman attempted to sub-
stitute another of entirely different quality. At the trial the prosecution
attempted to introduce evidence that the officers of the corporation had not only
acquiesced in the practice, but had expressly instructed the sales force to re-sell
articles which had already been once sold in case it was necessary in order to
satisfy the second customer. This evidence the trial court largely excluded.
Held, a corporation may not only be liable criminally for acts of its agents in
doing things prohibited by statute (where no intent is required) but ma- also be
guilty of larceny where the intent to steal is essential. In such a case, however,
the intent to steal must be the intent of the corporation and not merely that of
an agent and can be established only by proving authorization of the act by the
corporation's officers or acquiescence by them in the practice. It was error,
therefore, for the trial court to exclude the evidence offered by the prosecution
but although erroneous, the evidence stricken out could not be considered as evi-
dence in the case and without it the evidence was insufficient to sustain convic-
tion. Reversed and new trial ordered. The principal case is noted in 23 Il1. Law
Rev. 718.
SEDUCTION
Burney v. State, Texas, (1929) 13 S. W. (2nd) 375. Marriage of defendant
to prosecutrix before pleading to indictment a defense.
Prior to the institution of the prosecution for seduction, the defendant after
being threatened with death unless he did so, married the prosecutrix. A few
weeks thereafter he secured an annulment of the marriage on grounds of force
and duress. Immediately thereafter this prosecution was commenced. Art. 506,
Penal Code, provides: "If the parties marry each other at any time before' the
defendant pleads to the indictment-the prosecution shall be dismissed." The
trial court was of the opinion that there had been no marriage within the mean-
ing of this section and hence defendant was without a defense. Held, error.
Even though subsequently annulled for duress, the marriage of the parties is a
complete defense under the code.
SENTENCE
Fels v. Snook, Varden, Dist. Ct., N. Dist., Ga., (1929) 30 Fed. (2nd) 187.
Predating coninencenlent of sentence to imprisonment to time before offense
committed, unauthorized.
Prisoner committed an offense against Penal Code, 195 (18th U. S. Const.
Amend., 318), on June 22, 1928. He was tried, convicted and on July 20, sen-
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tenced to imprisonment in the United States Penitentiary at Atlanta for a year
and a day, "the said sentence to date from the 1st day of February, 1928." Held,
on habeas corpus, that the trial court was without power to make the sentence
begin at a date prior to the commission of the offense. The court speaks of the
common practice, where there has been actual imprisonment of the accused
before trial in default of bond, of making the sentence date from the beginning
of such imprisonment. The principal case, however, goes far beyond this and
attempts to give credit for time that was never in any manner served, hence
lacks the practical justification of that practice. The decision seems sound.
SENTENCE
Ex Parte Gilbert, Calif. D. C. A., 275 Pac. 982. Ignoring statutory provi-
sion which is imfpossible in its application.
Defendant was convicted of attempted burglary and of a prior conviction of
burglary. Under Penal Code, sec. 664, he is subject to one-half the maximum
imprisonment for a first offense-which is life imprisonment. It is conceded
that a sentence of one half of a life is void. Held therefore that the prior con-
viction may be ignored and sentence may be imposed for the attempted burglary
alone.
STERILIZATION
Davis, Warden, v. Walton, Utah, 276 Pac. 921. Validity of sterilization law.
Laws (1925), ch. 82, authorizing sterilization of mental defectives under
prescribed conditions, held not to provide for cruel and unusual punishment,
contrary to Const., art. 1, see. 9.
Laws (1925), ch. 82, authorizing sterilization of mental defectives confined
in asylums or penal institutions, and prohibiting the performance of any opera-
tion destroying power of procreation, except as authorized, unless as medical
necessity, held not class legislation, denying equal protection of laws, contrary to
Const. of U. S., Amend. 14.
SUNDAY LAWS
State v. Stout, Okla., 276 Pac. 795. Operating a dance hall as "servile labor."
The words "servile labor," as used in sec. 1825, Comp. Sts. (1921), do not
have the same meaning as the words "common labor," "secular labor," "labor,"
or "work," but mean physical labor of a menial nature performed with the
hands. Held, that the acts done as alleged in the complaint are not "servile
labor" within the meaning of said section.
SUNDAY LAWS
Williams v. State, Ga., (1928) 144 S. E. 745. Sale of gasoline on Sabbath is
a "work of necessity."
In the light of modern day methods of traveling by automobile, the motor
power of which is derived from the use of gasoline, and in the light of present
day use to which automobiles are put, the sale of gasoline on the Sabbath is a
"work of necessity" within the contemplation of Penal Code (1910), 416, and
hence not a misdemeanor. The case is commented on in 2 S. Calif. Law Rev.
395.
